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Introduction  
 
The ‘BRICs’ acronym, in its most common usage, derives from a report to investors by 
Goldman Sachs’ analyst Jim O’Neill, signalling the new dynamic that four large countries; 
Brazil, Russia, India and China, were bringing to the global economy at the beginning of the 
new millennium. A conclusion advanced in the Goldman Sachs report was that the BRICs 
should be included in the G7 as their macroeconomic significance increased in the decade 
to come. From a global investment angle, the world has moved on from there to a wider set 
of dynamic emerging countries, including a number of fast-growing African nations, as more 
developing countries find their own way to catch up on growth, resisting world recessionary 
tendencies (O’Neill 2001 2011).1 The investor’s world of emerging markets has thus 
expanded beyond the BRICs, even as questions are raised about the sustainability of growth 
in the BRICs themselves, with their structural and political challenges and their vulnerability 
to the uncertainties of global monetary developments. 
 
This Evidence Report focuses on a distinct phenomenon – the BRICS Summits, as an 
ongoing new global governance process, spanning both economic and security issues, 
launched as a geopolitical initiative by Russia in 2006 at the level of foreign ministers.2 A first 
Leaders’ meeting was hosted by Russia in Yekaterinburg in June 2009, bringing in Heads of 
State from Brazil, India and China. South Africa joined in 2010 on the invitation of China 
following the Sanya BRIC Summit, to make up the present BRICS Summit group.  
 
We look at this BRICS Summit process as part of the broadening of the global governance 
system created following the Second World War, in which United States (US) leadership and 
hegemony has been a vital element, to a polycentric global governance system that is now 
evolving fast but with a future still undetermined (Ikenberry 2006).3 There is now a 
burgeoning literature on the BRICS, written in this vein, which is providing some of the 
keenest contemporary insights into the geopolitics and the geoeconomics of this still to be 
determined future world order (Carmody 2013; EUISS 2013; Kornegay and Bohler-Muller 
2013a, 2013b; Observer Research Foundation 2013; Kornegay 2013a, 2013b, 2013c; 
Sidaway 2012).4 
 
Against this background, we first place the BRICS Summit process in the current and 
possible evolution in the world economy and the international system, and then provide an 
overview on how the BRICS development cooperation policies, collectively and in each 
member country, are evolving, identifying related issues and prospects. A more 
comprehensive and in-depth treatment of these issues is at the centre of the IDS Rising 
Powers in Development (RPID) Programme, with an initial set of collected results to be 
published ahead of the 6th BRICS Summit in Fortaleza, Brazil.  
 
                                                          
1 Further groups of such countries have been identified, including a ‘next 11’ (Goldman Sachs), a set of 26 frontier markets 
(MSCI Barra) and a diverse group of countries with growth rates faster than China, the Post-China 16 (see Stratfor (2013) ‘The 
Post-China 16: Ascendant Manufacturing Countries’). 
2 At the suggestion of Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, the Brazilian Foreign Minister Celso Amorim was invited to one 
of the regular New York lunches of the RIC Foreign Ministers (Russia, India, China), and the BRIC idea was born there.  RIC 
Summits continue to be held each year. 
3 Ikenberry provides an overview of the dynamics of the post-Second World War world order based on multilateralism, but 
subject to unilateralist pressures within the United States hegemon. 
4 These references provide a reading of the underlying dynamics of the BRICS Summit process. The South African Foreign 
Policy Initiative (SAFPI) Policy Brief 36 (Kornegay 2013a) provides the central analysis of the AISA volume, and SAFPI Policy 
Brief 48 (Kornegay 2013c) a reading of the dynamics of the new MITKA group (Mexico, Indonesia, Turkey, South Korea and 
Australia). Sidaway provides an account of how categories and terminology are being overtaken by complex new geographies 
of development. The European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS) provides a current European reading of the BRICS.  
The Observer Research Foundation Report is a basis for further work at the BRICS Summits on long-term visioning.  
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1 The BRICS Summits and transitions in  
global economic governance 
 
By 2030, according to the World Bank, two-thirds of global savings and investment will be in 
developing countries, including the BRICS in that category, compared with one-fifth in 2000  
(World Bank 2013a, 2013b). And according to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD), China and India together will be larger than the whole OECD 
economy by 2025 (OECD 2013). While the post-Second World War global order has 
facilitated this current revolution in development achievements and prospects, it is clear that 
a major adjustment of global governance arrangements will be needed, as a functional 
matter. And indeed this adjustment is already underway.  
 
The formation of the BRICS Summit process is to be seen as a part of this adjustment.  
Reform of international financial and economic institutions and the promotion of a polycentric 
and multi-polar system have been and remain the explicit founding idea of the BRICS 
Summits. The eThekwini Leader’s Declaration from the 5th BRICS Summit held in Durban in 
March 2013 notes that ‘the prevailing global governance architecture is regulated by 
institutions which were conceived in circumstances when the international landscape in all its 
aspects was characterised by very different challenges and opportunities’. It then sets out 
the objective of ‘progressively developing the BRICS into a full-fledged mechanism of current 
and long-term coordination on a wide range of key issues of the world economy and politics’. 
The action plan includes the establishment of a ‘virtual secretariat’ (BRICS5 2013b). 
 
In this broad context, the BRICS Summit identity is, we consider, most accurately considered 
as a group of ‘non-G7’ countries providing themselves with a forum where they do not have 
to contend for air-time and agenda-setting with ‘Western’ powers and their intellectual 
frameworks and which provides the possibility to impact, symbolically, rhetorically and 
programmatically, on global economic, development and political agendas. The BRICS 
members consider their development experiences to be different from the standard model 
embodied in mainstream development narratives. And they are consciously seeking to build 
their soft power in the new global economy, individually and collectively. In that sense, the 
BRICS Summits are clearly challenging the existing world order and its institutions.  
 
At the same time, the BRICS members are all fully committed to the G20 Leaders process, 
itself a manifestation of the new and evolving global governance system. One member, 
Russia, is a member of the G8 which has not, contrary to some expectations, withered away. 
Along with a wide range of developing countries, all of the BRICS engage in substantive 
engagement and joint work within the OECD and participate in OECD annual Ministerial 
meetings.5 Hence, the BRICS Summit process might be said to be ‘nested within’ a larger 
process of systemic change in global governance which ultimately will produce convergence, 
albeit with challenge and contestation, even if the pace and nature of any such change 
cannot at this point be foreseen (BRICS5 2013a; Observer Research Foundation 2013).6  
 
Both the G20 and the BRICS, as self-selected groupings of countries with divergent interests 
and governance systems, and with no objective approach to representativity, are contested 
in terms of legitimacy, as centres of authority in the global system. There are also severe 
critiques of their performance, whether it be on progress on voice and voting power in the 
Bretton Woods institutions or on the weaknesses in the system of global financial 
                                                          
5 The OECD developed programmes for interacting with dynamic developing countries from the late 1980s, following an internal 
report on The OECD and the Major Developing Countries, (OECD Archives) evolving through workshops to outreach to the 
current global relations programme, including enhanced engagement with the BRIICS (includes Indonesia). 
6 For a wide-ranging discussion on the nature of the BRICS as a non-confrontational forum for working on new global 
governance patterns and cooperation processes see (BRICS5a). 
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supervision established following the financial crisis, or in the failure of the BRICS to concert 
on candidacies for President of the World Bank (Wade and Vestergaard 2012; Woods 2010). 
Academics and civil society groups are now exercising ‘surveillance’ on both processes, a 
manifestation that the world order is not only becoming multi-polar, but also polycentric, with 
many sources of initiative, ideas and sanction, notably powered by the social media (CIGI; 
University of Toronto BRICS Information Centre). 
 
In the absence of a total breakdown or climactic event in the international system (arguably 
the financial crisis came close to such a point), the problem of redesign of global governance 
in the twenty-first century can hardly be negotiated in a Congress of Vienna or a Versailles 
Treaty, or a San Francisco Conference or new Bretton Woods Agreement. While the 
significance of current developments in the global governance system should not be 
underestimated, evolutionary change rather than revolutionary institutional redesign is, at 
this point, the order of the day.7 The BRICS Summit, and the G20 processes have thus been 
constructed in a new informal space in the global arena, where in terms of both time and 
budgets, transaction costs in origination and operation have been kept very low. And neither 
the BRICS Summit Process nor the G20 are looking to create whole new institutional 
frameworks. Nevertheless, as noted above, the BRICS project includes an ambition to 
become a fully-fledged process and to create a ‘virtual secretariat’. Meanwhile, the G20 has 
declared itself to be the world’s premier economic coordination forum (a positioning explicitly 
endorsed by the BRICS), and effectively draws upon and coordinates, to a greater or lesser 
extent, the work of the major international organisations, filling a much needed role here. 
The creation of a collective G20 website in place of the increasingly extensive websites set 
up by each successive Presidency is a live discussion, as the G20 evolves from an 
improvised crisis committee to being a steering group for the world (Cooper 2010). 
 
The BRICS process and the G20 share the same modalities pioneered by the G8: Heads of 
State meetings, with revolving chairing/hosting arrangements (with a ‘troika’ system 
operating in the G20); ad hoc working groups of ministers and officials; forward work 
programmes; and structured engagement of non-state actors, including think tanks (T20) 
and business (B20). Here the G20 structure reaches to include civil society (C20), labour 
unions (L20) and youth (Y20). The BRICS have created an Academic Forum with the BRICS 
Think Tank, and at the 2013 Summit in Durban, created a BRICS Business Council which 
held its first meeting in Johannesburg in September 2013.8 While the BRICS have not yet 
extended to structured engagement with civil society and labour unions or youth there are 
prospects that parallel academic, trade union and civil society meetings held at the last 
Durban Summit may be more connected into the BRICS Academic Forum under the 
Brazilian Presidency. Like the G20, the BRICS Summit process has diplomatic outreach 
programmes which seek to engender support and cooperation.9  
 
A key dynamic in the BRICS process, like the G20, is the revolving leadership. Each country 
that takes on the BRICS Presidency has a strong incentive to produce substantive 
outcomes, to carry forward agreed agendas and to emerge with enhanced reputation. The 
flexibility and range of the Heads of State formula has strong advantages here, even if it is 
vulnerable to changing political winds, to agenda creep or capture and to disguised or 
undisguised disagreement on some points. In principle, as Heads of State Groups, they 
have the special possibility of reaching across policies and institutions to achieve the 
coordination and coherence that is the scarcest global public good of all. A glance at the 
communiqués of the BRICS and the G20 indicates the extensive work programmes they 
                                                          
7 For a view that ‘multilateralism light’ via G groups is where the action is see www.nytimes.com/2013/09/05/opinion/global/the-
g-20s-rising-clout.html. See also Stewart (2014) for a perception that international cooperation is increasingly placed outside 
formal institutions, in informal groups and ad hoc venues. 
8 www.brics5.co.za/joint-statement-of-the-brics-business-council-meeting-held-on-19-august-2013-sandton-convention-centre-
johannesburg-south-africa/. 
9 At the initiative of the President of the General Assembly, the G20 troika met informally with UN delegations in New York last 
February and agreed on regular interactions. 
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have taken on across issues and ministries, with processes and meetings in motion on a 
constant basis (BRICS 2013b; G20 2013). The Think Tank groups that they have both 
convened assist in this capacity for synthesis and looking ahead. The coordination and 
coherence functions of both groups will be tested in 2015 when global agreements on 
development strategies and on climate change are scheduled almost simultaneously at the 
end of 2015. The G20 has committed in its St Petersburg Declaration to participate actively 
in the process of producing a successor framework to the MDGs and, on the side of the 
BRICS, the eThekwini Declaration sketched out some parameters for such a framework. 
 
The legitimacy issues that face the BRICS and also the G20 can be summed up under two 
categories: performance and values/reputation.  
 
Regarding performance, as mentioned above, both groups are subject to strong critiques 
on performance and there is a tendency towards cynicism in much comment. While the 
essential role played by the G20 in crisis management in 2009 is acknowledged, there is 
much disappointment with follow-up particularly on global financial governance issues. But 
the G20 work programme has in fact evolved significantly, addressing many crucial public 
policy issues in ways that were not possible before, including pulling together the work of a 
wide range of international institutions (Carin and Schorr 2013). And the BRICS process has 
substantive work in fields such as health, agriculture, urbanisation and science and 
technology, led by biennial Ministerial meetings supported by technical groups. (There is 
also a process in which BRICS competition authorities meet regularly, inviting their peers 
from OECD countries.) The 2013 eThekwini Declaration also announced future work on 
State-owned enterprises. The potential role of the BRICS in providing a new development 
finance institution – the BRICS Bank – has made perhaps the biggest impression, and is 
explored below as an important work in progress, with multi-dimensional implications. But 
with less attention in the headlines, the BRICS sectoral work is in fact creating an important 
mutual learning process among the BRICS, drawing on their different development and 
political contexts to find a whole range of lessons and future directions for joint study in 
areas such as rural-urban dynamics, interaction between social policies and health policies, 
sustainable urbanisation etc., as is evident from the outputs of the various meetings. These 
are all areas where BRICS cooperation has potential global as well as group benefits, as for 
example, the health agenda work underway on multi-drug resistant tuberculosis (TB), 
HIV/aids, and non-communicable diseases.10 
 
Hence, both the BRICS and the G20 have evolved in terms of substantive scope of work and 
associated processes in ways that go well beyond their beginnings to bring direct Heads of 
State involvement into a range of key social and economic areas, with flexible high level 
policy groups and technical support. This is a noteworthy evolution in global governance. 
 
On the side of values/reputation, the BRICS Summits (as also the G20), encompass a wide 
range of political philosophies and practices. Despite this diversity, in neither group do we 
see overt normative contestation at this point. Rather, there is pragmatic progress and 
accommodation. In terms of perceptions, at a time of huge geopolitical shifts and 
environmental and development challenges and as global governance roles become more 
widely shared, the BRICS are looking to play a shaping role. Hence values and reputation 
are critical to the credibility of the BRICS.11 It is on this level that difficulties and dysfunctions 
in leading Western governance systems, and the failure so far to generate a strong and 
                                                          
10 For accounts of the discussions and work ongoing in these areas see  
www.brics5.co.za/about-brics/sectorial-declaration/agriculture-ministers-meeting/brics-agricultural-action, 
www.brics5.co.za/assets/The-2nd-BRICS-Urbanisation-Forum-The-Durban-Declaration-1-November-28th-2013-Durban-
KwaZulu-Natal-South-Africa.pdf, 
www.brics5.co.za/3rd-health-ministers-meeting-south-africa-7th-november-2013-cape-town-communique/, 
www.brics5.co.za/assets/BRICS-STI-CAPE-TOWN-COMMUNIQUE-OF-10-FEBRUARY-2014.pdf. 
11 See Cormier (2012). 
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sustained recovery from a Western-centred systems crisis have opened the way for the 
BRICS to come forward as global leaders. But that opening in turn poses challenges of 
values and reputation for the BRICS and creates dynamics among other non-G7 members 
of the G20. Thus, the BRICS have inspired the formation of a further grouping nested inside 
the G20 with the acronym MITKA – Mexico, Indonesia, Turkey, South Korea and Australia.12 
  
The recent comprehensive reform package in China, including but extending beyond market-
based economic reform to land rights, urban residence rights, human rights, space for civil 
society and a reformed justice system, promises to do much to bolster China’s position in 
areas of perceived weakness. This Chinese reform package will strengthen political 
solidarity within the BRICS. Russian accession to the OECD, projected for 2012 and then 
2013, but still moving forward if slowly, would reinforce its position and the interconnections 
between the G8, G20 and the BRICS. India, Brazil and South Africa as ‘democratic 
emerging powers’ all have strong positions on human rights and democratic values, but at 
the same time, complex local inequities and regional problems that qualify their actions and 
records (Jenkins and Mawdsley 2013). The India, Brazil and South Africa (IBSA) process 
continues, although with less prominence than the BRICS, and spans a wide range of 
cooperation, including security issues in the Southern Indian and Atlantic Oceans. In terms 
of reputation, the common resolve to counter inequalities, corruption and terrorism to resist 
nuclear proliferation, and to contribute to strengthening global efforts on development and 
climate change in new global compacts in 2015, would underline the convergence dimension 
in the BRICS positioning.  
 
In terms of vision, the BRICS Summits are the only global process with an explicit objective 
to constitute a new global order in line with the massive change in economic weight that is 
coming in the next decade. The stated objective of the BRICS here is to ensure that this 
coming world order is inclusive and just, in line with historic South-South principles for a 
post-colonial world order, with the United Nations (UN) as the centre of systemic legitimacy. 
 
At this level, complex geopolitical factors come into play. While the BRICS Summits are 
projected as the voice of the global South, there are divergent interests and priorities among 
the BRICS on UN Security Council reform and some nascent and even overt conflicts on 
territorial boundaries, spheres of influence, and economic and monetary policies. There are 
also difficult frontlines with the international economic system in the areas of currency 
management and trade, where the BRICS Summit process will be tested as its members 
confront their increasing interests in and responsibilities for global system functioning. The 
global trade and financial systems are fragmenting (notwithstanding the ‘Bali Package’ 
agreed at the WTO Ministerial Meeting in December 2013), just as China and India in 
particular become the key drivers of the world economy with impact on development 
dynamics in all continents. World Trade Organization (WTO) multilateralism, now under 
BRICS leadership, has been contending with a tide of regional free trade agreements. 
Currently trade multilateralism faces mega-regional agreements in the trans-Pacifica and 
Atlantic arenas, so far excluding the BRICS countries, whose positions on access to their 
markets have been among the obstacles to concluding the WTO Doha Round. On the 
financial side, the new BRICS US$100bn Contingency Reserve Arrangement, seeks to 
provide a degree of independence from International Monetary Fund (IMF) processes for 
emergency funding. 
  
In this context it is significant that the BRICS process is featuring as an integral element of 
the global strategies being articulated by each of the BRIC member countries. This is most 
advanced in the case of Russia, the initiator of the BRICS Summits. A concept note on 
Russian Foreign Policy was issued in February 2013, and alongside that, a concept note on 
the BRICS. An explicit thrust in these concept notes is to envisage an active role for Russia 
                                                          
12 See SAFPI Policy Brief 48 (Kornegay (2013c). 
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in supplying global public goods in a new multi-polar global system (Russian Federation 
2013; Monaghan 2013).  
 
In the case of China, a major component of foreign policy is the New Model of Major Power 
Relations between China and the United States, the NMMPR, explicitly directed at ensuring 
that its growing global interests do not replicate previous historical experiences where rising 
powers have been associated with war, notably in both European and Asian theatres. China 
believes that a basic accord has been reached with the United States on this concept as the 
essential framework for their relationship, with three key elements: ‘no conflict or 
confrontation’; ‘mutual respect’, and ‘win-win cooperation’ (Wang Yi 2013). There are evident 
challenges still to be surmounted here as regional histories and current tensions show and 
the nature and objectives of the Obama Administration’s ‘pivot to Asia’ play out. 
 
An elaboration of foreign policy directions for China in the coming decade has recently been 
issued by a leading think tank associated with the Chinese foreign ministry (Shanghai 
Institutes for International Studies 2013). With the NMMPR as a basis, this preview provides 
a comprehensive outline of China’s key foreign policy interests, challenges and strategies 
both in its own multi-frontier neighbourhood and across all major world regions and thematic 
concerns. The role of the BRICS Summit Group is built into this vision alongside an explicit 
strategic objective of a more active role for China in supplying global public goods.  
 
The last two BRICS Summits have generated systemic thinking in the host countries, India 
and South Africa. In India, in the context of the New Delhi Summit of 2012, the Observer 
Research Foundation, a leading participant in the BRICS think tank process, produced a 
Long-Term Vision for BRICS strategy paper on the BRICS Summit Process as a submission 
to the BRICS Academic Forum. The ‘Long-Term Vision’ was reviewed by the BRICS Think 
Tank Council in Durban ahead of the Durban BRICS Summit and then issued by the 
Observer Research Foundation (Observer Research Foundation 2013). Now to be finalised 
by the South African Think Tank institutions involved, the BRICS ‘Long-Term Vision’ paper 
covers common domestic challenges and global political and economic governance and sets 
out suggestions on the BRICS Development Bank proposal.  
 
A number of ministerial speeches articulate South African thinking on the role of the BRICS, 
in particular South Africa’s role in linking African policy concerns and inputs with the BRICS 
process (Nkoana-Mashabane 2013).13 This is contested territory, both within South Africa 
and across the continent where South African leadership is not a given (Carmody 2013; 
Dube 2013; Kornegay and Bohler-Muller 2013a). 
 
The 2014 BRICS Summit to be held in Fortaleza, with the Academic Forum to be hosted in 
Rio de Janeiro in March ahead of the Summit, will no doubt also bring forth positioning 
statements from the Brazilian side. Brazilian civil society is likely to be active and to focus on 
the work of the BRICS Summit on common domestic challenges such as inequality, 
particularly in the context of the upcoming Presidential election. The relevant chapters in the 
BRICS ‘Long-Term Vision’ as drafted by the Observer Research Foundation could well be 
used and strengthened by the government against the background of the major 
demonstrations across Brazil earlier in 2013. Now scheduled to follow just two days after the 
World Cup soccer final in Rio de Janeiro, there is a question as to what extent the BRICS 
Summit event and its domestic policy and global governance agendas attract significant 
public attention linked to Brazilian public discontents and associated public policy issues. 
 
                                                          
13 For an official statement on South Africa’s place in the BRICS see www.brics5.co.za/about-brics/south-africa-in-brics/. 
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2 The BRICS and international development 
cooperation 
 
What impact are the BRICS own diverse development experiences having on development 
thinking and practice around the world? How do their development experiences feed into the 
design and execution of their external development cooperation programmes? And what 
impact are the BRICS processes for coordination on international development policy 
discussions having on influencing international development agendas and approaches? 
These are the question that the IDS Programme on the Rising Powers is addressing with 
regard to not only the BRICS but to a wider group of ‘rising powers’. With respect to the 
BRICS, an initial set of ‘State of the Debate’ country papers undertaken with local research 
institutions will be available for events planned within the IDS Rising Powers in Development 
Programme in parallel with the BRICS Academic Forum to be held in Rio de Janeiro in mid-
March 2014. 
 
Here, we look at some of the broader settings for this work; historical and current. First, there 
is the existence of two traditions of development assistance since the end of the Second 
World War. The US ‘Point 4’ initiative announced in President Truman’s inaugural address in 
1949 aimed to establish a rapid modernisation effort to transform developing countries 
largely by technical assistance but also with finance (Mazower 2012). The World Bank 
concessional financing window (the International Development Association, known generally 
by its acronym as ‘the IDA’) was a US congressional initiative, adopted with reluctance by 
the World Bank management to head off the establishment of a UN-based concessional 
fund (the aborted Special United Nations Fund for Economic Development (SUNFED)). In 
parallel, as the decolonisation process gathered pace at the end of the 1950s, the US 
proposed the establishment of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) at the newly 
constituted OECD, as the basis for a more broadly based development effort in which the 
former colonial powers (the UK, France, Portugal and the Dutch) would bring their ongoing 
financial support for their former colonies into a multilateral framework.  
 
The Development Assistance Committee became the arena for forging rules of the game 
and best practices for OECD donors. A key element in the rule making was the definition of 
Official Development Assistance (ODA) and the associated reporting systems in 1969 (and 
refined in 1972) that together enabled ‘burden sharing’ among the OECD donors to be 
assessed on a commonly accepted basis. To be counted as ODA, financing had to be for 
activities to the benefit of developing countries; reflows and financial benefits for donor 
countries were to be deducted from ODA; and commercial benefits were to be constrained 
by the untying of aid, although it took until 2001 before any untying agreement emerged 
(Hynes and Scott 2013). It was export credit disciplines negotiated among trade ministries in 
1978 and then extended as a gentlemen’s agreement among ‘participants’ in 1991 that 
provided the rules of the game for holding in check competition among donor countries for 
export markets on the basis of financial terms (OECD 2008).14 
 
Based on an earlier proposal from the World Council of Churches for a target for flows of all 
financial resources to developing countries, the iconic 0.7 per cent target for ODA emerged 
in 1974 as a ‘UN target’, not as a DAC target, but has been endorsed by all DAC members 
except for the United States. Struggles among donors on burden sharing issues, on 
definitions, on aid tying and on aid practices have stretched across decades. And 
geopolitical developments including the Cold War, the end of the Cold War, and the advent 
of ‘emerging donors’ have had major impacts on DAC issues and decisions. Indeed the 
‘emerging donors’ phenomenon is a major force behind the recent decision of the DAC to 
                                                          
14 See OECD (2008) The Export Credits Arrangement 1978 – 2008. 
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undertake a comprehensive review of ODA definitions and reporting systems, with the 
objective of achieving as wide a community of development finance reporters as possible. In 
May 2013 the OECD Secretariat submitted a background research paper to the UN 
Secretary-General’s High Level Panel on Post-2015 Development Strategies containing a 
proposal for a global information system on development and climate finance.15 
 
In sum, the DAC has provided the intellectual and political framework for the concept and 
measurement of ODA, for the assessment of efforts via the peer-review system, and for the 
development of a wide range of best practices. With annual high level meetings and senior 
level meetings; multiple working parties and expert groups; membership by the World Bank, 
IMF and United Nations Development Programme (UNDP); and sponsorship of a series of 
international High Level Forums on Aid Effectiveness bringing in civil society, research 
institutions and the private sector, a whole community of aid policymakers, researchers, 
evaluators, consultancies, advocates and commentators has evolved over the years into 
what is sometimes referred to as the ‘aid industry’. The new Global Partnership on Effective 
Development Cooperation established following the Busan 4th High Level Forum on Aid 
Effectiveness, hosted by South Korea at the end of 2011, brings all these players into a 
shared ‘space’, with developing countries playing a leading role and the emerging donors 
participating as one among other constituencies, on the basis of an explicit recognition of 
South-South development cooperation with its longstanding set of values and practices.16,17 
 
The roots of the South-South tradition of development cooperation go back further than the 
founding of the DAC, to the Bandung Conference of 1955, followed by the formation of the 
Non-Aligned Movement in 1961 in a Cold War context and then the Group of 77 in 1964 in a 
North-South context, joined by China when it took up its seat in the UN in 1971 
(G77+China).  
 
The Bandung Conference of 29 Asian and African countries (Latin America was not 
involved) sought to promote economic and cultural cooperation ‘on the basis of mutual 
interest and respect for national sovereignty’ as one of its principal outcomes. The final 
communiqué of the conference set out to promote cooperation via technical assistance to 
one another, through the exchange of experts and technical assistance for developmental 
projects, as well as the exchange of technological know-how, the establishment of regional 
training and research institutes, and sharing skills in dealing with international organisations. 
 
At the same time the Bandung Conference (which included China, Japan and Turkey), 
welcomed foreign aid and investment from outside the region. While consultation ahead of 
meetings in international fora was one action point, the communiqué explicitly stated that 
there was no intention to form an economic bloc. South-South cooperation has remained 
very much in this non-ideological pragmatic mode. Although, like DAC development 
cooperation providers, South-South providers have been caught up in Cold War and North-
South dynamics in different ways at different times, South-South development cooperation 
has remained largely outside of the agendas of the Non-Aligned Movement and the G77 and 
G77+China, or the purview of the G24, which focuses on influencing Bretton Woods 
agendas. The UN system has provided the ongoing forum for discussions of South-South 
cooperation, with a largely supportive and non-controversial character.  
 
Nevertheless, it is quite clear from these two different histories, that the intellectual and 
political dynamics underpinning the world of DAC development cooperation have been 
particular to the process of building the post WWII world order as a project of the West, led 
                                                          
15 See www.post2015hlp.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/OECD_A-Post-2015-Information-System-for-International-
Development-and-Climate-Finance.pdf. 
16 For the concept of constituencies in the Global Partnership for Effective Development, see DAC High Level Meeting 
Communiqué, London, 2012 paragraph 13 (DAC High Level Meeting 2012). 
17 For an account of the rise of the emerging donors, see Mawdsley (2012). 
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by the United States. Hence the whole structure of the ODA definition and reporting has 
been built around financial resource transfers and burden sharing and related DAC and UN 
commitments. Technical cooperation has been included in that structure, but regarded as a 
large black box with attendant issues of reporting and effectiveness and colonial hangover.18  
 
For classic South-South development cooperation however, low-cost technical cooperation 
is the central activity, and financial transfers of little consequence. The two key concepts 
from Bandung of mutual benefits and respect for national sovereignty have remained central 
in further iterations of South-South principles. While a standard part of the UN Charter, these 
two key principles have been at the root of underlying tensions between South providers and 
DAC providers; the mutual benefits principle providing room for the mixing of aid, trade and 
investment packages which get a red flag in the OECD/DAC arena, while mutual respect for 
national sovereignty provides justification for non-interference, as in the absence of policy 
and governance conditionalities. 
 
A more elaborated set of operational guidance for South-South cooperation was embodied 
in the 1978 Buenos Aries Plan of Action (BAPA),19 under the Technical Cooperation among 
Developing Countries (TCDC) activity of the UNDP, and subsequently endorsed by the UN 
General Assembly (High Level United Nations Conference on South-South Cooperation 
1978). These South-South cooperation meetings have continued, the most recent in Nairobi 
in 2009, and BAPA remains an important reference point for South-South cooperation, with a 
UN Office for South-South Cooperation (UNOSSC) located in the UNDP maintaining an 
active programme of South-South Expos and support for bilateral partnership agreements.20  
 
At the same time, South-South technical cooperation activities have most often been spread 
among different sectoral or policy ministries with no overarching strategic direction. There 
has been nothing comparable to the emergence of an ‘aid industry’ in DAC countries. 
Programming and project preparation and evaluation have remained a relatively 
undeveloped function for the most part. Reporting of aid by providers from the South has 
been difficult to organise.21  
 
Until very recently, the only exception here has been the aid efforts of the Gulf oil-exporting 
countries, where a structured aid industry with dedicated professional agencies emerged 
from the highly specific context of the massive increase in oil revenues from the mid-1970s. 
Significantly, during the years of very high aid levels from these countries in the 1970s, an 
annual DAC-OPEC (Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries) dialogue was held. 
And today, Arab donors report their aid efforts through the DAC reporting system. The Soviet 
Union did have a major aid programme of course, but outside of the South-South and DAC 
frameworks, although in the context of the détente in the Cold War and then the fall of the 
Berlin Wall, a relationship between Russia and the DAC did develop, which is only now 
being documented.22 Russia reports its current aid activities through the DAC reporting 
system. China’s aid programme dates from the 1950s, with a set of principles laid out by 
Chou En-lai in 1964, which retain contemporary resonance. Chinese aid allocations 
supported governments emerging from national liberation movements and recognising the 
‘one China’ policy. From the mid-1990s a new set of ‘Policy Banks’ was created to fund 
development projects, and joint ventures run on a commercial basis became a way of 
ensuring the sustainability of projects.  
 
                                                          
18 Germany (GIZ) and Japan (JICA) have retained significant bilateral technical assistance agencies with entrepreneurial 
qualities and learning cultures, often underappreciated in the DAC context until relatively recently. Canada’s IDRC also falls into 
this category. 
19 See http://southsouthconference.org/?page_id=276 (accessed 12 February 2014). 
20 See http://ssc.undp.org/content/ssc.html. 
21 A growing number of South providers do now report to the DAC, and the UN Development Cooperation Forum secretariat is 
succeeding in getting a fairly complete response to its own questionnaire.  
22 See Hynes and Trzeciak-Duval (forthcoming). 
 
 
12 
 
The phenomenon of the ‘emerging donors’ is now changing the game, as evidenced above. 
While the phenomenon has been noted and documented for some time,23 events have 
moved forward quite rapidly in the recent past. There are now more South-South providers 
with structured aid programmes and increasingly, with dedicated development cooperation 
agencies and significant financial assistance alongside technical cooperation. Recent 
examples include India (the Indian Development Partnership Administration) and South 
Africa (the South African Development Partnership Agency). Russia and Brazil each have 
development cooperation agencies (the ABC in Brazil and the Rossotrudnichestvo in 
Russia) but are actively in the process of redesigning them in the context of emerging new 
development cooperation strategies. And beyond the BRICS other examples are to be 
found, for example, in Thailand, Malaysia, Mexico and Peru. 
 
China alone among the BRICS is not currently envisaging the establishment of such an 
agency.24 However, China has begun to publish White Papers on Foreign Aid; the first in 
2011, launched at a televised press conference by the Vice Minister of Commerce. A second 
White Paper is imminent. The Ministry of Commerce has established an Institute for 
International Development Cooperation within its research arm (China Academy for 
International Trade and Economic Cooperation – CAITEC). On an academic initiative from 
the China Agriculture University, a China International Development Research Network 
(CIDRN) has been launched, bringing together 20 Chinese development research institutes, 
with an International Advisory Committee as an active part of the implementation 
arrangements.25 The objective is to foster Chinese capacities to analyse and communicate 
China’s own experience in development and to participate in international development 
debates and policy processes. While China’s foreign aid is mainly channelled through the 
Ministry of Commerce People’s Republic of China (MOFCOM), different ministries and even 
provincial and municipal governments also have extensive overseas programs marked by 
international cooperation, notably, China’s global health programme, and a recently 
launched foreign aid programme for science and technology. China’s Foreign Ministry leads 
the tri-annual FOCAC process (Forum on China-Africa Cooperation) which generates 
significant financial and policy commitments.  
 
Based on previous and on-going efforts by MOFCOM for improving foreign aid management, 
there appears to be a reinforced investment in aid programme effectiveness, which provides 
further opportunities to work with OECD/DAC members. A UK-Department for International 
Development (DFID) and China-MOFCOM joint capacity activity to enhance the skills of 
China’s foreign aid officials is a typical example of this convergence.  
 
A China-DAC study group, launched in 2009 on a Chinese initiative, conducted a series of 
major conferences identifying how aid could support economic transformation, based on 
Chinese experience and drawing lessons for Chinese and OECD aid and African 
development policies. The study group continues to provide a mutual learning interface 
between Chinese and OECD policy experts.26 The most recent Senior Level Meeting of the 
DAC, in March 2014, was attended by a Chinese delegation led by a Director-General from 
MofCOM. 
 
Indeed the game has changed, as South providers become much more than marginal 
players in terms of macro-level impacts, and hence concerned with systemic outcomes, 
long-term sustainability and state fragility. Even though aid from South providers measured 
on a basis comparable to ODA remains modest (perhaps in the region of US$12bn or 
around 10 per cent of ODA flows), other official credits (OOF in DAC terms) and export 
                                                          
23 See Manning (2006) ‘Will “Emerging Donors” Change the Face of International Cooperation?’ 
24 The idea of a Chinese aid agency has been launched in academic circles however, including in the context of an assessment 
of the 12 years of the Forum for China-Africa Co-operation. See Li, Haifang and Huaqiong (2012). 
25 See website at http://rcid.cau.edu.cn/art/2013/12/2/art_7640_229164.html  (accessed 10 March 2014). 
26 Report available at www.trademarksa.org/news/china-dac-report-how-it-happened-china-helping-it-happen-africa. 
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credits within a development context are much larger. In such a context, a common interest 
in development effectiveness is emerging. 
 
Here the Busan High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness at the end of 2011 marked a 
meeting point between the two traditions: South-South cooperation and the DAC process as 
described above. A difficult feat of diplomacy saw a last minute agreement whereby South-
South providers joined on a voluntary basis in the Outcome Document, which inter alia is the 
foundation for a new Global Partnership on Effective Development Cooperation.27 Given that 
all who signed the Busan Outcome Document have done so on a voluntary basis, there is an 
argument that in practice there are no distinctions between countries who have signed on 
and that the language of North and South has ceased to have meaning in the new global 
economic geography. At the same time there are initiatives to modernise and strengthen 
South-South Development Cooperation, notably in the context of the UN Development 
Cooperation Forum (ECOSOC 2013; UN 2013). 
 
Against this background, a question of particular interest is how China’s development 
assistance modalities and development paradigm might influence and be influenced by this 
apparent convergence, given the radical increase in China’s development financing flows in 
recent years? This question is addressed in a forthcoming paper co-written by one of the 
present authors.28 The prospect emerging in that paper is of a likely convergence of interests 
and approaches given the shared common goal of global development, growth and poverty 
reduction. Despite the different histories and perceptions of different approaches to,         
e.g. policy conditionality, there is more that is similar than different in actual practice between 
China and DAC donors. This is also the view emerging from the recent book by long time 
researcher on Chinese aid, Deborah Brautigam (2009). The new China International 
Development Research Network will help to illuminate these questions.  
 
Where the differences in approach are perhaps most palpable is in the ambition levels for 
economic transformation, where China is ready and able to lift financial flows to levels which 
test debt sustainability and export credit disciplines. Nevertheless, the discussion emerging 
in the G20 context on the policy and market failures in long-term investment in infrastructure 
suggest that here too there may be more common ground than is apparent.29 Indeed 
Chinese experience and institutional capacity to deliver long-term infrastructure finance 
provides a counterpoint to the problems in the provision of long-term financing by OECD 
financial markets. In this context the notion that public development institutions have a role 
to play is making something of a comeback.  
 
  
                                                          
27 See Kim and Lee (2013). 
28 See Li Xiaoyun, Banik, D., Tang Lixia and Wu Jin. ‘Differing Paths but a Common Goal: China’s Development Assistance 
and International Development Effectiveness’, IDS Bulletin, forthcoming July 2014. 
29 For a discussion of the issues of debt sustainability and transformative infrastructure investments, see Xu and Carey (2013) 
The Renaissance of Public Entrepreneurship: Governing Development Finance in a Transforming World, paper submitted to 
the High Level Panel on the Post-2015 Development Agenda, www.post2015hlp.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/Xu-
Carey_The-Renaissance-of-Public-Entrepreneurship-Governing-Development-Finance-in-a-Transforming-
World_FINALFINAL.pdf. 
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3 The BRICS Bank proposal – the New 
Development Bank 
 
At this point the project of the BRICS to establish a New Development Bank, mainly 
focused on investing in infrastructure, becomes relevant. There is little question that the 
project has a signalling role as much as a practical role. The challenge is to the pre-eminent 
position of the World Bank as the reference point for the governance and practice of 
multilateral development finance and thinking about development.  
 
It is common ground in the G20 that there is, in principle, a huge need to scale up long-term 
finance, where there is an important ongoing work programme to tackle the policy and 
market failures that stand in the way of generating long-term finance.30 There is also the 
global macroeconomic case – a major shortfall in investment spending in developed 
countries with deteriorating infrastructure (the United States), and in developing countries 
where there is a huge unmet demand for infrastructure. A major boost to such additional 
investment programmes would do much to fix the lagging recovery from the financial crisis.31 
 
A New Development Bank cannot be built in a day of course. And infrastructure projects 
cannot be switched on immediately. As the G20 work is showing, there needs to be a supply 
of bankable projects and a stream of long-term finance as interdependent elements of a 
scaled up infrastructure investment system, that yields long-term income streams for savers 
such as pension funds and sovereign wealth funds.  
 
In principle the World Bank and the regional development banks could most quickly be 
mobilised to effect such a major scale-up. But the political consensus to do so would be 
extremely difficult to organise.  
 
What the BRICS have done essentially is to generate a consensus around an Indian 
initiative launched at the New Delhi BRICS Summit in 2012, and progressed sufficiently to 
announce the basic structure of the institution in September 2013 in St Petersburg. The 
announced aim is to have the whole institutional design ready for agreement at the Brazil 
BRICS Summit in July 2014. The choice of a ‘cooperative’ model of equal shares and capital 
of US$50bn avoids long negotiations and future struggles over voting shares, although it 
limits the size of the capital base compared with a capital structure where China especially 
might have subscribed a lot more, but then assumed a dominant role in the Bank. Other 
members are clearly not ready to live with that. (China has meanwhile proposed the 
establishment of two further new development banks; an Asian Infrastructure Investment 
Bank,32 and a Shanghai Cooperation Organization Development Bank.)33  
 
The BRICS Long-Term Vision Report, published by the Observer Research Foundation, 
estimates that the announced capital structure could support US$9bn per year annual 
disbursements. For comparison, the total non-concessional disbursements of the World 
Bank and the regional development banks (Asia, Latin America, Africa, Europe) were 
US$20bn in 2012; their concessional disbursements were a further US$39bn. 
 
China’s own policy banks already have financing capacities well beyond the proposed New 
Development Bank. Other BRICS members also have national development banks which 
engage in financing projects in developing countries. A BRICS Interbank Cooperation 
Mechanism meets annually and organises operational cooperation among these member 
                                                          
30 See www.oecd.org/pensions/private-pensions/g20-oecd-long-term-financing.htm. 
31 See Qiao Yu (2013) and Wolf (2013). 
32 See www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2013-10/03/content_17007977.htm. 
33 See www.sectsco.org/EN123/show.asp?id=443. 
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banks - the Development Bank of South Africa (DBSA), the China Development Bank 
(CDB), EXIM Bank of India, Russia’s Vnesheconombank and Brazil’s Banco Nacional de 
Desenvolvimento Economico e Social (BNDES).34 Hence, the total development financing 
capacity of the BRICS is a multiple of the capacity added via the New Development Bank. In 
addition, at the 2013 Durban Summit, the Interbank Cooperation Mechanism concluded two 
co-financing agreements: a BRICS Multilateral Infrastructure Financing Agreement for Africa, 
and a BRICS Multilateral Cooperation and Co-Financing Agreement for Sustainable 
Development. 
 
This range of activity and planned expansion implies impressive capacity expansion in 
operational areas such as professional staffing and research, and effective business models 
for project preparation, evaluation functions and risk management. The existence of the 
national development banks in each of the BRICS and their Interbank Cooperation 
Mechanism provides a pool of experience and capacity on which the New Development 
Bank can no doubt draw.35 However, a number of critical issues should be noted:  
 
First, some especially sensitive areas such as environmental, resettlement and corporate 
responsibility safeguards, which are very likely to be under scrutiny from international as well 
as national civil society. The launch of the New Development Bank will undoubtedly attract 
international attention and require a level of transparency necessary to respond to that.  
 
Some if not all of the BRICS members already have safeguard policies in place. For 
example, China has already issued green growth and corporate responsibility guidelines for 
all Chinese external investors, and Chinese non-governmental organisations (NGOs) have 
also worked on sensitising Chinese firms overseas to Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) 
and environmental protection.36 
 
Second, the advantage of the New Development Bank will be largely to provide development 
financing based on its members’ development experiences. However, it will also need to 
coordinate with existing development financing institutions and mechanisms. 
 
Third, following from this, the policy and research agendas of the New Development Bank 
will be keenly observed, especially if the ambition is to create an intellectual framework for 
thinking about development that is different from the World Bank and the regional 
development banks, most likely drawing on the concept of the developmental state. The 
BRICS Academic Forum meeting in Durban certainly envisaged the New Development Bank 
also as a Knowledge Bank bringing new perspectives to bear on development challenges in 
a reshaping world economy.37  
 
Fourth, how the ‘non-interference’ principle might be handled will also be of interest given 
the BRICS involvement in fragile states and their own evolving approaches to these 
situations.38 
 
Fifth, internal management capacity and governance systems for efficiency and 
effectiveness as well as accountability are important challenges. These are areas where the 
                                                          
34 See National Treasury Republic of South Africa (2013). 
35 There are numerous studies on these institutions. See for example the Harvard Business School Case Study on the China 
Development Bank (Li Jin, Preble and Sesia 2011). On BNDES, see critique of concessional lending by former Chief 
Economist Armando Pinheiro (2012). 
36 For example, in February 2012, the China Banking Regulatory Commission issued a new Directive to the Green Credit 
Policy, which specifically instructs Chinese banks to adhere to international environmental and social financing standards in 
overseas transactions. This has been followed in March 2013 by a joint Ministry of Commerce and Ministry of Environment 
Guidance Note on environmental protection in Foreign Investment and Cooperation, to regulate and guide all Chinese 
enterprises in their investment overseas. The guidance extends to environmental protection, social standards and labour rights, 
http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/article/newsrelease/significantnews/201303/20130300043146.shtml.   
37 See www.brics5.co.za/report-of-the-fifth-brics-academic-forum-10-13-march-2013-durban-south-africa-2/. 
38 See ‘Security in China-Africa Relations’ Special Issue, The China Monitor, September 2013. 
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BRICS can develop cooperation rather than competition with existing international 
development financing institutions such as the World Bank and other regional banks. 
  
4 Conclusion 
 
The BRICS Summit process seen as a global governance forum in a world with a new 
economic geography, initiated on the basis of an idea from Russia, puts a whole new 
perspective on the nature of the BRICS. It is from this angle that the IDS project on the 
Rising Powers seeks to work with academic institutions in the BRICS and other dynamic 
developing countries, to map new development knowledge and foster intellectual 
collaboration around the evolution of development policies and impacts on the functioning of 
the international system. 
 
Such impacts are already palpable, as seen for example in the context of the vision for a 
new informal global space for discussing development effectiveness that emerged from the 
Busan High Level Forum. And the BRICS Bank proposal has already entered into the 
landscape of development finance policymakers even if it is not yet fully visible. The recent 
World Bank Report on Financing for Development Post-2015 treads ground that would not 
have been covered without the BRICS influence, notably on resources for infrastructure 
deals in fragile states (World Bank 2013b). 
 
This paper suggests that the challenge element implicit and sometimes explicit in the BRICS 
Summit process is balanced by strong convergence forces, such as the commitment to the 
G20 process, increasing convergence of domestic reform within the BRICS, and 
systematisation of their South-South cooperation programmes. Beyond that, as the BRICS 
become the largest economic entities in the global economy so they will acquire increasing 
stakes in peace and stability around the world, including in the Eurasian continent where 
three members have intersecting interests and relationships. Moreover, their soft power 
becomes increasingly important and that implies a concern for reputation, credibility and 
legitimacy. Not least, they will also be engaging with domestic civil society on these fronts, 
as the IDS ‘State of the Debate’ work indicates. Ultimately therefore, the BRICS are a 
positive indication for a broader and stronger, responsive and responsible global governance 
system for a changed world.  
 
With respect to global development, and with the absence of any serious prospect of major 
scaling up of established development finance institutions, this paper finds that the BRICS 
promise to introduce new channels into the international development finance arena 
particularly through the two initiatives out of Durban – the agreements on co-financing 
among their development banks for infrastructure and the green economy, and more 
powerfully through the BRICS Development Bank. But these are challenging initiatives in 
terms of integrating the different BRICS experiences, a frontier which will be tricky to 
negotiate.39 Complementarity with other international development financing channels will be 
built on the unique development experiences of the BRICS. That is likely to bring a focus on 
‘hardware’ development which fills the gap that established development institutions left as 
they put more investment into ‘software’ development. At the same time, both hardware and 
software are needed in the development process and the BRICS can bring into play their 
own recent and current development experiences and challenges in that respect.  
 
                                                          
39 For a sceptical reading of the prospects that South-South providers can develop a shared paradigm that might challenge the 
DAC aid effectiveness paradigm, see Quadir (2013). 
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Thus, in a context of growing financing flows via the BRICS official institutions and ongoing 
institutional development and management enhancement within the BRICS, there is the 
prospect of a convergence of thinking and practice. The development effectiveness concept 
will, to a larger or lesser extent, serve to reduce the divergence between South-South 
cooperation and North-South cooperation paradigms, even if the political dynamics remain 
different. Simultaneously, future development vectors appear most likely to integrate the 
different paths into the new development architecture as indicated by the ‘common goals but 
differentiated responsibilities’ formulation. However, this should not be seen as a ‘burden 
transfer’ process, but rather as a genuine commitment to bring together different 
development experiences. 
 
The Rising Powers in Development Programme with its ‘State of the Debate’ country studies 
will look at the political economy of their development cooperation as well as their own 
domestic social and economic development narratives and progress. This programme will 
thus expand our understanding and appreciation of what the BRICS can do collectively and 
bilaterally, and of the key instruments and institutions they have at hand.  
 
What is new and essential here is the creation of mutual learning processes based around 
specific sectors and themes as a central function of the BRICS Summits. This is pushing out 
the frontiers of development thinking and practice and political cooperation as this divergent 
set of countries with disparate development experiences and challenges seeks to bring past 
and future perspectives which are different from those of established powers to bear on 
current development frontiers. The philosophy behind this process is already set out in 
South-South thinking since Bandung, and in the OECD world captured in the Marshall Plan 
philosophy of peer learning, subsequently built into the OECD as a knowledge-sharing 
institution. The world of Bandung has changed but the aspirations for knowledge exchange 
are more relevant now than ever. What the BRICS Summits are sharing is new knowledge, 
generated by development and political trajectories not imagined or imaginable a few 
decades ago, and it is being applied to real time policy frontiers. Hence, the BRICS Summits 
are emerging as a knowledge-exchange process among countries looking to a future world 
order in which they will have major roles and responsibilities.40 
 
The main contribution of the RPID programme will be, therefore, to identify the comparative 
experiences of the BRICS in the current and future international development arena, drawing 
the lessons from their own development processes, so that a future new development 
framework can be developed.  
 
Such a future international cooperation framework will be based on polycentric geopolitics 
and multiple development experiences, involving both systemic challenge and convergence, 
and will differ from previously dominant structures, both intellectually and practically. 
 
  
                                                          
40 For a reading of the limits to the will and the capacity of the BRICS to create a new world order that is fundamentally different 
from the present evolutionary path, see Oliver Stuenkel, www.postwesternworld.com. 
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